Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing Networks: When does it help? by Sekar, Shreyas et al.
Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing
Networks: When does it help?
Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff, and Baosen Zhang
Abstract—We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-
commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain
users where each user over- or under-estimates their conges-
tion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that
uncertainties in different directions have qualitatively distinct
impacts on equilibria. Namely, contrary to the usual notion that
uncertainty increases inefficiencies, network congestion actually
decreases when users over-estimate their costs. On the other
hand, under-estimation of costs leads to increased congestion.
We apply these results to urban transportation networks, where
drivers have different estimates about the cost of congestion. In
light of the dynamic pricing policies aimed at tackling congestion,
our results indicate that users’ perception of these prices can
significantly impact the policy’s efficacy, and “caution in the face
of uncertainty” leads to favorable network conditions.
Index Terms—Network Routing, Uncertainty, Nash Equilib-
rium, Transportation
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTI-COMMODITY routing networks that allocateresources to self-interested users lie at the heart of
many systems such as communication, transportation, and
power networks (see, e.g., [1] for an overview). In all of these
systems, users inherently face uncertainty and are heteroge-
neous. These users rarely have perfect information about the
state of the system, and each have their own idiosyncratic
objectives and tradeoffs between time, money, and risk [2]–[4].
Naturally, these private beliefs influence each user’s decision
and, in turn, the total welfare of the overall system. In this
paper, we provide an understanding of the effects of certain
classes of uncertainties and user heterogeneity with respect to
such uncertainties on network performance. In particular, we
establish conditions on when they are helpful and harmful to
the overall social welfare of the system.
A motivating example of a routing network that we use
throughout this paper is the urban transportation network.
Commuters in road networks simultaneously trade-off between
diverse objectives such as total travel time, road taxes, parking
costs, waiting delays, walking distance and environmental
impact. At the same time, these users tend to possess varying
levels of information and heterogeneous attitudes, and there
is evidence [5], [6] to suggest that the routes adopted depend
not on the true costs but on how they are perceived by the
users. For instance, users prefer more consistent routes over
those with high variance [7], seek to minimize travel time
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over parking costs [8], and react adversely to per-mile road
taxes [9].
Furthermore, the technological and economic incentives
employed by planners interact with user beliefs in a complex
manner [10]. For example, to limit the economic losses
arising from urban congestion, cities across the world have
introduced a number of solutions including road taxes, time-
of-day-pricing, road-side message signs and route recom-
mendations [11]–[14]. However, the dynamic nature of these
incentives (e.g., frequent price updates) and the limited avail-
ability of information dispersal mechanisms may add to users’
uncertainties and asymmetries in beliefs.
The effect of uncertainties on network equilibria has been
examined in recent work [10], [15]–[17] where each user
perceives the network condition to be different than the true
conditions. The current results have mostly focused on simple
network topologies (e.g., parallel links) or networks where a
fixed percentage of the population is endowed with a specific
level of uncertainty. Given the complexity of most practical
networks, it is natural to ask how uncertainty (i.e. user beliefs)
affects equilibria in scenarios with many types of users, whose
perceptions vary according to the user type. Specifically, in
this work we answer the following two questions: (i) how
do equilibria depend on the type and level of uncertainty
in networks with multiple types of users, and (ii) when does
uncertainty improve or degrade equilibrium quality?
To address these questions, we turn to a multi-commodity
selfish routing framework commonly employed by many dis-
ciplines (see, e.g., [18]–[21]). In our model, each user seeks
to route some flow from a source to a destination across
a network and faces congestion costs on each link. These
congestion costs are perceived differently by each user in the
network, representing the uncertainties in their beliefs.
It is well-known that even in the presence of perfect infor-
mation (every user knows the exact true cost), strategic behav-
ior by the users can result in considerably worse congestion at
equilibrium when compared to a centrally optimized routing
solution [22]. Against this backdrop, we analyze what happens
when users have imperfect knowledge of the congestion costs.
A surprising outcome arises: in the presence of uncertainty, if
users select routes based on perceived costs that over-estimate
the true cost, the equilibrium quality is better compared to
perfect information case. Conversely, if the users are not
cautious and under-estimate the costs, the equilibrium quality
becomes worse.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
08
44
1v
4 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
1 J
an
 20
18
A. Contributions
We introduce the notion of type-dependent uncertainty in
multi-commodity routing networks, where the uncertainty of
users belonging to type θ is captured by a single parameter
rθ > 0. Specifically, for each user of type θ, if their true cost
on edge e is given by Ce(x) = aex+ be, where x is the total
population of users on this edge, then their perceived cost is
rθaex+ be.
For the majority of this work, we will focus on cautious
behavior, where users over-estimate the costs (rθ ≥ 1), for
all types θ. Some of our results will also hold for the case
where users under-estimate the costs (rθ ≤ 1), for all types θ.
The central message of this paper is that when users exhibit
“caution in the face of uncertainty”, the social cost at the
equilibrium is smaller compared to the case where users have
perfect information (i.e. know the true congestion costs).
The following results are independent of network topology:
(a) The social cost—i.e. C(x) =
∑
e∈E xeCe(xe) where xe
is the total population mass, summed over all user types,
flowing on edge e—of the equilibrium1 solution where
all users have the same level of uncertainty (rθ = r for
all θ) is always smaller than or equal to the cost of the
equilibrium solution without uncertainty when r ∈ [1, 2]
and vice-versa when r < 1.
(b) The worst-case ratio of the social cost of the equilibrium
to that of the socially optimal solution (i.e. the price
of anarchy [22]) is 4/(4rmaxγ − r2max), where rmax =
maxθ rθ and γ ≤ 1 is the ratio of the minimum to the
maximum uncertainty over user types.
Constraining network topology, we show the following:
(a) The social cost of the equilibrium where a fraction
of the users exhibit an uncertainty of r ∈ [1, 2] and
the rest have no uncertainty is always smaller than or
equal to the social cost of an identical system without
uncertainty, as long as the network has the serially
linearly independent topology (a subclass of series-
parallel networks [23]).
(b) In systems having users with and without uncertainty,
the routing choices adopted by the uncertain users al-
ways results in an improvement in the costs experienced
by users without uncertainty, as long as the graph has a
series-parallel topology [23].
At a high level, the main contribution of this work can
be viewed as a nuanced characterization of the instances
(i.e. network topologies, levels of uncertainty) for which
uncertainty is helpful in reducing the equilibrium congestion
levels. We show that these characterizations are tight by means
of illustrative examples where uncertainty leads to an increase
in the social cost when our characterization conditions are
violated. Finally, many of our results also extend gracefully
to instances having polynomial edge cost functions, which are
of the form C(x) = axd + b (see Section III-C).
To validate the theoretical results, we present a number of
simulation results. We focus specifically on the application
1For the multi-commodity routing game studied in this work, the equilib-
rium is essentially unique as all equilibria induce the same flow on the edges;
see Proposition 1
of parking in urban transportation networks and consider
realistic urban network topologies with two types of users:
through traffic and parking users. Given a parking population
with uncertainties, we show that cautious behavior improves
equilibrium quality while lack of caution degrades it even
when uncertainty is asymmetric across user types and when
the same user faces different levels of uncertainty on different
parts of network.
B. Comparison with Other Models of Uncertainty
Our work is closely related to the extensive body of work on
risk-averse selfish routing [24]–[26] and pricing tolls in con-
gestion networks [2], [10], [27]. The former line of research
focuses on the well known mean-standard deviation model
where each self-interested user selects a path that minimizes a
linear combination of their expected travel time and standard
deviation. While such an objective is desirable from a central
planner’s perspective, experimental studies suggest that indi-
viduals tend to employ simpler heuristics when faced with
uncertainty [28]. Motivated by this, we adopt a multiplicative
model of uncertainty similar to [29]–[31].
The literature on computing tolls for heterogeneous users
is driven by the need to implement the optimum routing
by adjusting the toll amount, which is often interpreted as
the time–money tradeoff, on each edge. It is possible to
draw parallels between additive uncertainty models (such as
the mean–standard deviation model) and tolling; specifically,
tolling can be viewed as adjusting for users’ uncertainty. While
tolls can be (within reason) arbitrarily decided, the system
planner has little influence over the level of uncertainty among
the users. Bearing this in mind, we strive for a more subtle
understanding of how equilibrium congestion depends on the
level of uncertainty. Moreover, while many of the results in
this paper focus on the effect of over-estimating costs, different
than the existing literature, we also study the effect of cost
under-estimation.
Finally, our work is thematically similar to the recent paper
on the informational Braess paradox [19] whose model can be
viewed as an extreme case of our model where the uncertainty
parameter rθ is so high on some edges (rθ → ∞) that users
always avoid such edges. On the other hand, our model is more
continuous as user attitudes are parameterized by a finite value
of rθ, which allows for a more realistic depiction of the trade-
offs faced by users who must balance travel time, congestion,
and uncertainty. Although both the characterizations make
use of the serially linearly independent topology, it is worth
pointing out that our results do not follow from [19] and
require different techniques that capture a more continuous
trade-off between uncertainty and social cost.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we formally introduce our model followed by our main results
in Sections III and IV. Section V presents our simulation
results on urban transportation networks with parking and
routing users who face different levels of uncertainty. Finally,
we conclude with discussion in Section VI.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a non-atomic, multi-commodity selfish routing
game with multiple types of users. Specifically, we consider
a network represented as G = (V, E) where V is the set of
nodes and E is the set of edges. For each edge e ∈ E , we
define a linear cost function
Ce(xe) = aexe + be, (1)
where xe ≥ 0 is the total population (or flow) of users on that
edge and ae, be ≥ 0. One can interpret Ce(·) as the true cost or
expected congestion felt by the users on this edge. However,
due to uncertainty, users may perceive the cost on each edge
e ∈ E to be different from its true cost.
To capture that users may have different perceived un-
certainties, we introduce the notion of type. Specifically, we
consider a finite set of user types T , where each type θ ∈ T
is uniquely defined by the following tuple (sθ, tθ, µθ, rθ).
The parameter µθ > 0 denotes the total population of users
belonging to type θ such that each of these infinitesimal users
seeks to route some flow from its source node sθ ∈ V to the
destination node tθ ∈ V . Moreover, the parameter rθ > 0
captures the beliefs or uncertainties associated with users of
type θ and affects the edge cost in the following way: users
of type θ perceive the cost of edge e ∈ E to be
Cˆθe (xe) = rθaexe + be. (2)
For illustration, consider an urban transportation network.
Then be may represent the constant travel time on a link
(in the absence of other vehicles) and aexe, the congestion-
dependent component of the travel time. A multiplicative
uncertainty of rθ > 1 indicates that users of type θ adversely
view costs arising due to congestion (e.g., waiting in traffic)
when compared to other costs. Alternatively, aexe could also
represent a congestion-dependent toll or tax that is commonly
levied in transportation infrastructure such as highways or
parking, and the parameter rθ captures the time-money trade-
off [32].
A path p ∈ Pθ is a sequence of edges connecting sθ to tθ.
Define Pθ to be the set of all sθ–tθ paths in G. Let xθp ∈ R be
the total flow routed by users of type θ on path p ∈ Pθ. We
use the notation x = (xθp)θ∈T ,p∈Pθ ∈ R|T |·|Pθ| for a network
flow and xθ = (xθp)p∈Pθ to denote the network flow of type
θ ∈ T . Then, for each type θ ∈ T , define the set of feasible
flows to be
Xθ = {xθ|
∑
p∈Pθ x
θ
p = µθ, x
θ
p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ Pθ}. (3)
The action space of users of type θ is Xθ—that is, users of
type θ choose a feasible flow xθ ∈ Xθ. Further, define the
joint action space X = (Xθ)θ∈T—i.e. the space of feasible
flows for all user types.
Path flows induce edge flows. Let xθe ∈ R be the flow on
edge e due to users of type θ. The edge and path flow for
users of type θ are related by
xθe =
∑
p∈Pθ,e∈p x
θ
p.
Define the total flow on edge e to be
xe =
∑
θ∈T x
θ
e.
Then, using this notation, we write the path cost in terms of
edge flow. For any path p,
Cp(x) =
∑
e∈p Ce(xe) =
∑
e∈p(aexe + be). (4)
Similarly, the perceived path costs are given by
Cˆθp(x) =
∑
e∈p Cˆ
θ
e (xe) =
∑
e∈p rθaexe + be. (5)
Define the game instance
G = {(V, E), T ,X , (Pθ)θ∈T , (sθ, tθ, µθ, rθ)θ∈T , (Ce)e∈E}.
The game instance G captures all of the relevant information
about the multi-commodity routing game including the notion
of type-based uncertainty we are interested in studying.
A. Nash Equilibrium Concept
We assume that the users in the system are self-interested
and route their flow with the goal of minimizing their indi-
vidual cost. Therefore, the solution concept of interest in such
a setting is that of a Nash equilibrium, where each user type
routes their flow on minimum cost paths with respect to their
perceived cost functions and the actions of the other users.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium): Given a game instance G,
a feasible flow x ∈ X is said to be a Nash equilibrium if for
every θ ∈ T , for all p ∈ Pθ with positive flow, xθp > 0,
Cˆθp(x) ≤ Cˆθp′(x), ∀ p′ ∈ Pθ (6)
For the rest of this work, we will assume that all the flows
considered are feasible.
Remark 1 (User Beliefs): For the sake of completeness
and to understand how an equilibrium is reached, we briefly
comment on each user’s beliefs about the uncertainties of the
other users. We assume that type-based uncertainty is not only
known within the type but across all types—that is, a user of
type θ knows the uncertainty levels of the users of all other
types. While a user knowing the uncertainty level within its
own type may not be unreasonable, full knowledge of the
uncertainties of the other types is a strong assumption.
This being said, for the types of games we consider—games
admitting a potential function, which we formally define in
Proposition 1—a number of myopic learning rules2 converge
to Nash equilibria (see, e.g., [33] and references therein). We
are currently investigating layered belief structures coupled
with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept. Some recent work
has investigated such structures in a routing game context [34];
however, it is well known that equilibria in these types of
games are computationally difficult to resolve.
B. Social Cost and Price of Anarchy
One of the central goals in this work is to compare the qual-
ity of the equilibrium solution in the presence of uncertainty
to the socially optimal flow as, e.g., computed by a centralized
2By myopic learning rules, we mean rules for iterated play that require
each player to have minimal-to-no knowledge of other players’ cost functions
and/or strategies.
planner with the goal of minimizing the aggregate cost in the
system. Specifically, the social cost of a flow x is given by
C(x) =
∑
e∈E Ce(xe)xe. (7)
Note that the social cost is only measured with respect to the
true congestion costs and thus does not reflect users’ beliefs
or uncertainties.
To capture inefficiencies, we leverage the well-studied
notion of the price of anarchy which is the ratio of the
social cost of the worst-case Nash equilibrium to that of the
socially optimal solution. Formally, given an instance G of a
multi-commodity routing game belonging to some class C of
instances (a class refers to a set of instances that share some
property) suppose that x∗ is the flow that minimizes the social
cost C(x) and that x˜ is the Nash equilibrium for the given
instance, then the price of anarchy is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Price of Anarchy): Given a class of instances
C, the price of anarchy for this class is
maxG∈C C(x˜)/C(x∗). (8)
Since, we study a cost-minimizing game, the price of anarchy
is always greater than or equal to one.
III. MAIN RESULTS
To support these main theoretical results, we first show
that our game is a potential game. Routing games that fall
into the general class of potential games have a number
of nice properties in terms of existence, uniqueness, and
computability [33]. General multi-commodity, selfish routing
games with heterogeneous users, however, do not belong to
the class of potential games unless certain assumptions on the
edge cost structure are met [20].
In our case, since we have linear latencies for each type
and the uncertainty parameter only appears on the aexe term
for each edge, the following proposition states that the game
instances of the form we consider admit a potential function
and hence, there always exists a Nash equilibrium [20].
Proposition 1: A feasible flow x is a Nash equilibrium for
a given instance G of a multi-commodity routing game with
uncertainty vector (rθ)θ∈T if and only if it minimizes the
following potential function:
Φr(x) =
∑
e∈E
(
1
2aex
2
e + be
∑
θ∈T
1
rθ
xθe
)
(9)
Moreover, for any two minimizers x,x′, Ce(xe) = Ce(x′e) for
every edge e ∈ E .
Note that although users perceive the multiplicative uncer-
tainty rθ on the ae term (see Equation (2)), the parameter
appears in the denominator of the be term in the potential
function above. Conceptually, these have a similar effect:
dividing Equation (6) by rθ on both sides, one can obtain
equivalent equilibrium conditions where the rθ term is present
in the denominator of the constant be.
Proof: By definition, a feasible flow x ∈ X is a Nash
equilibrium if the following condition is satisfied for all θ ∈ T
and for all p, p′ ∈ Pθ with xθp > 0:∑
e∈p(rθaexe + be) ≤
∑
e∈p′(rθaexe + be).
Since rθ > 0, this is equivalent to
∑
e∈p(aexe +
be
rθ
) ≤∑
e∈p′(aexe +
be
rθ
). The remainder of proof trivially follows
from standard arguments pertaining to the minimizer of a
convex function. See [33] for more detail.
The second part of the proposition indicates that the equi-
libria are essentially unique as the cost on every edge is the
same across solutions.
A. Effect of Uncertainty on Equilibrium Quality
Our first main result identifies a special case of the general
multi-commodity game for which uncertainty helps improve
equilibrium quality—i.e. decreases the social cost—whenever
users over-estimate their costs by a small factor and vice-versa
when they under-estimate costs. To show this result, we need
the following technical lemma.
Lemma 1: Given an instance G of a multi-commodity selfish
routing game with Nash equilibrium x˜ = (x˜e)e∈E , we have
that for any feasible flow x,
C(x˜)− C(x) ≤ −∑θ∈T ( 2rθ − 1)∑e∈E be∆xθe, (10)
where ∆xθe = x˜
θ
e − xθe.
The proof of the above lemma is provided in Appendix A.
Given an instance G of the multi-commodity routing game,
we define G1 to be the corresponding game instance with no
uncertainty—that is, G1 has the same graph, cost functions,
and user types as G, yet rθ = 1 for all θ ∈ T .
Theorem 1: Consider any given instance G of the multi-
commodity routing game with Nash equilibrium x˜ and the
corresponding game instance G1, having no uncertainty, with
Nash equilibrium x1. Suppose rθ = r for all θ ∈ T . Then,
the following hold:
1) C(x˜) ≤ C(x1) if 1 ≤ r ≤ 2.
2) C(x˜) ≥ C(x1) if 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Remark: What happens when the users are highly cautious,
i.e., rθ > 2 for all θ? Due to the presence of a few negative
examples where the social cost increases in the presence
of uncertainty, we cannot conclusively state that uncertainty
helps or hurts for all instances. However, these negative
instances appear to be isolated—both our price of anarchy
result (Theorem 2) and our experiments (Section V) validate
our claim that caution in the face of uncertainty helps the users
by lowering equilibrium social costs even when rθ > 2—i.e.,
uncertainty is favorable when the users are very cautious. It
is however, interesting to note that although under-estimation
always leads to a worse equilibrium, over-estimation may lead
to better or worse equilibria.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let Φr(x) denote the potential func-
tion for the instance G and Φ1(x) denote the potential function
for G1 where Φ1 is given in (9) with r = 1. By definition of
the potential function, we know that Φr(x˜)−Φr(x1) ≤ 0 and
Φ1(x
1) − Φ1(x˜) ≤ 0. Expanding these two inequalities, we
get that∑
e∈E
(
aex˜
2
e
2 + be
∑
θ∈T
x˜θe
r − ae(x
1
e)
2
2 − be
∑
θ∈T
x1,θe
r
)
≤ 0,
and∑
e∈E
(
ae(x
1
e)
2
2 + be
∑
θ∈T x
1,θ
e − aex˜
2
e
2 − be
∑
θ∈T x˜
θ
e
)
≤ 0,
where x1,θe denotes the total flow on edge e by users of type
θ in the solution x1. Let us define ∆xθe = x˜
θ
e − x1,θe , and
∆xe = x˜e − x1e. By summing the above inequalities, the ae
terms cancel out giving us∑
e∈E be
∑
θ∈T (
∆xθe
r −∆xθe) =
∑
e∈E be
∑
θ∈T (
1
r − 1)∆xθe
where the right-hand side is less than or equal to zero. Using
the fact that
∑
θ ∆x
θ
e = ∆xe for all edges, we get that
( 1r − 1)
∑
e∈E be∆xe ≤ 0. (11)
Hence,
1) When r > 1, ( 1r − 1) < 0 so that
∑
e∈E be∆xe ≥ 0.
2) When r < 1, ( 1r − 1) > 0 so that
∑
e∈E be∆xe ≤ 0.
We finish the proof by considering two separate cases: (case
1) 1 ≤ r ≤ 2 and (case 2) r < 1.
Let us consider (case 1) where 1 ≤ r ≤ 2. Applying
Lemma 1 to the instance G with x = x1, we obtain that
C(x˜)− C(x1) ≤ (1− 2r )
∑
e∈E be∆xe. (12)
We claim that when r ∈ (1, 2], the right-hand side of (12) is
lesser than or equal to zero. This is not particularly hard to
deduce owing to the fact that (1− 2r ) < 0 in the given range
and that
∑
e∈E be∆xe ≥ 0 as deduced from (11). Therefore,
C(x˜) − C(x1) ≤ 0, which proves the claim that uncertainty
with a limited amount of caution helps lower equilibrium costs.
Now, let us consider (case 2) where r < 1. Applying
Lemma 1 to the instance G1 with x = x˜, and using the fact
that ∆xe = x˜e − x1e, we have that
C(x1)− C(x˜) ≤ ( 2r − 1)
∑
e∈E be∆xe. (13)
Once again when r < 1, we know that 2r − 1 > 0 and from
(6), we can deduce that
∑
e∈E be∆xe ≤ 0 in the given range.
The following corollary identifies a specific level of uncer-
tainty at which the equilibrium solution is actually optimal.
Corollary 1: Given an instance G of the multi-commodity
routing game, let x˜ denote its Nash equilibrium and x∗ denote
the socially optimal flow. If rθ = 2 for all θ ∈ T , then C(x˜) =
C(x∗)—i.e. the equilibrium is socially optimal.
Proof: Suppose rθ = r = 2. Then, applying Lemma 1,
we have that C(x˜)−C(x∗) ≤ −( 2r − 1)
∑
e∈E be −∆xe = 0.
B. Price of Anarchy Under Uncertainty
In Theorem 1, we showed that the equilibrium cost under
uncertainty decreases (resp. increases) when users are mildly
cautious (resp. not cautious) and all user types have the same
level of uncertainty. This naturally raises the question of
quantifying the improvement (or degradation) in equilibrium
quality and whether uncertainty helps when the uncertainty
parameter can differ between user types. In the following
theorem, we address both of these questions by providing price
of anarchy bounds as a function of the maximum uncertainty
in the system and γ, which is the ratio between the minimum
and maximum uncertainty among user types.
Theorem 2: (Price of Anarchy) For any multi-commodity
routing game G, the ratio between the social cost of the Nash
equilibrium to that of the socially optimal solution is at most
PoA(G) = 4/(4γrmax − r2max), (14)
where rmax = maxθ∈T rθ, and γ = minθ rθmaxθ rθ as long as rmax <
4γ.
Before proving Theorem 2, we remark on the price of
anarchy and its dependence on the level of uncertainty. The
price of anarchy in (14) is plotted in Fig. 1 as a function of
rmax for three different values of γ. This result validates our
message that uncertainty helps equilibrium quality when users
over-estimate their costs and hurts equilibrium quality when
users under-estimate their costs. To understand why, let us first
consider the case of γ = 1—i.e. the uncertainty is the same
across user types. We already know that in the absence of
uncertainty, the price of anarchy of multi-commodity routing
games with linear costs is given by 4/3 [22]; this can also be
seen by substituting rmax = 1, γ = 1 in (14). We observe
that the price of anarchy is strictly smaller than 4/3 for
rmax ≤ 2 and reaches the optimum value of 1 at rmax = 2
thereby confirming Corollary 1. More interestingly, even when
rmax > 2, the price of anarchy with uncertainty is smaller than
that without uncertainty, affirming our previous statement that
cautious behavior helps lower congestion (at least in the worst
case).
Similarly, as rmax decreases away from one, the price of
anarchy increases nearly linearly. In fact, our price of anarchy
result goes one step beyond Theorem 1 as it provides guaran-
tees even when different user types have different uncertainty
levels. For example, when rmax = 1.5, and γ = 0.9—
i.e. minθ rθ ≈ 1.35—the price of anarchy is 1.24, which
is still better than the price of anarchy without uncertainty.
The price of anarchy result reveals a surprising observation:
as long as rmax > 1 and γ is not too large, for any given
instance G of the multi-commodity routing game, either the
equilibrium quality is already good or uncertainty helps lower
congestion by a significant amount. Therefore, uncertainty
rarely hurts the quality of the equilibrium and often helps.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need the following
technical lemma whose proof is provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 2: For any two non-negative vectors of equal length,
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n), let x =
∑n
i=1 xi and
x′ =
∑n
i=1 x
′
i. Moreover, let r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) be another
vector of length n whose entries are strictly positive. Then, if
we let r∗ = mini ri and r∗ = maxi ri, for any given function
f(y) = ay + b with a, b ≥ 0, we have that
f(x)x
f(x′)x′+
∑n
i=1(xi−x′i)f(rix) ≤ 4
(
4r∗ − (r∗)2
)−1
, (15)
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider some instance G of the
multi-commodity routing game with equilibrium x˜. Then,
adopting the variational inequality conditions for a Nash
equilibrium [15], [22], for any other solution x, and every
user type θ ∈ T ,∑
e∈E (rθaex˜e + be)
(
x˜θe − xθe
)
=
∑
e∈E Ce(rθx˜e)(x˜
θ
e − xθe)
≤ 0. (16)
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Fig. 1. Price of anarchy as a function of rmax = maxθ rθ for multi-
commodity selfish routing games for three different values of γ = minθ rθ
maxθ rθ
.
Smaller values of price of anarchy are favorable as they indicate that the cost
of the equilibrium solution is comparable to the social optimum. In general,
we observe that when rmax > 1, the price of anarchy under uncertainty is
smaller than that without uncertainty and vice-versa for rmax < 1. Yet, too
much caution or large asymmetries in the uncertainty level across user types
can also lead to poor equilibrium. For a fixed value of γ, we observe that the
price of anarchy drops initially as rmax increases and then starts increasing
once again beyond a certain threshold.
must hold. Fix any edge e ∈ E . Let (x1, . . . , xn) =
(x˜θe)θ∈T , x =
∑
θ∈T x˜
θ
e, (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) = (x
∗θ
e )θ∈T , and
x′ =
∑
θ∈T x
∗θ
e . Applying Lemma 2 with f(y) = Ce(y) and
r = (rθ)θ∈T , we have that
Ce(x˜e)x˜e ≤ ζ(Ce(x∗e)x∗e +
∑
θ∈T (x˜
θ
e − x∗θe )Ce (xerθ))
where
ζ = 4/(4rmin − r2max) = 4/(4γrmax − r2max), (17)
and where rmin = minθ∈T rθ and rmax = maxθ∈T rθ.
We claim that∑
e∈E Ce(x˜e)x˜e ≤ ζ
(∑
e∈E
∑
θ∈T (x˜
θ
e − x∗θe ) (rθaex˜e + be)
+
∑
e∈E Ce(x
∗
e)x
∗
e
)
≤ ζ∑e∈E Ce(x∗e)x∗e. (18)
Recall from (16) that for any type θ ∈ T ,∑
e∈E (rθaex˜e + be)
(
x˜θe − xθe
) ≤ 0. Since the price of
anarchy is defined as
∑
e∈E Ce(x˜e)x˜e∑
e∈E Ce(x∗e)x∗e
, a worst case bound of ζ
follows from Equation (18), giving us the theorem statement.
It is worth mentioning that the proof of the above theorem
carries over even when each user type has a different uncer-
tainty parameter on each edge. For example, suppose that rθ(e)
denotes the uncertainty parameter corresponding to users of
type θ on edge e ∈ E . In this general model, a similar price
of anarchy bound can be shown. Indeed, the price of anarchy
in this case is
PoA(G) = maxe∈E 4/(4γ(e)rmax(e)− r2max(e)),
where γ(e) = minθ∈T rθ(e)/(maxθ∈T rθ(e)) and rmax(e) =
maxθ∈T rθ(e).
C. Extensions to Polynomial Cost Functions
We now generalize our results in another direction by
considering multi-commodity routing games where the edges
have polynomial cost functions. Specifically, we consider
games where the cost function on any edge e ∈ E is of the
form Ce(x) = aexd + be, such that the degree d ≥ 1, and
a, b ≥ 0. This class of polynomial cost functions is referred
to as shifted monomials of degree d [35], and has received
considerable attention in the literature owing to applications in
transportation [36]–[38]— e.g., link performance as a function
of the number of cars on a road can be modeled as a shifted
monomial function of degree four [36].
We now show that both of our results from this section
extend gracefully to the case where the edges have shifted
monomial cost functions. In fact, when the edge cost functions
are super-linear, uncertainty leads to more favorable results
than the linear cost case. Informally, as the degree of the
monomial d grows, we show that uncertainty leads to a
decrease in the social cost for a larger range of the parameter
rθ. For convenience, we will assume that all edges have shifted
monomial cost functions with the same degree d ≥ 1.
We begin by a identifying the potential function that the
Nash equilibrium solution minimizes for a generalization of
the multi-commodity routing game where every edge e ∈ E
has the true cost function Ce(x) = aexd + be, which users
of type θ ∈ T perceive as Cˆθe (x) = rθaexd + be. Therefore,
equilibrium existence is guaranteed for this more general class
of functions.
Φd,r(x) =
∑
e∈E
(
1
d+1aex
d+1
e + be
∑
θ∈T
1
rθ
xθe
)
(19)
The following result generalizes Theorem 1 to games with
shifted monomial cost functions.
Proposition 2: Consider any given instance G of the multi-
commodity routing game with shifted monomial cost functions
of degree d having Nash equilibrium x˜ and the corresponding
game instance G1, having no uncertainty, with Nash equilib-
rium x1. Suppose rθ = r for all θ ∈ T . Then, the following
hold:
1) C(x˜) ≤ C(x1) if 1 ≤ r ≤ d+ 1.
2) C(x˜) ≥ C(x1) if 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
In comparison to Theorem 1 where uncertainty results in a
decrease in social cost for r ∈ [1, 2], we observe (surprisingly)
that the range of the uncertainty parameter under which
caution yields an improvement in social cost increases linearly
with d, i.e., uncertainty is more helpful as the cost function
is more convex. On the other hand, the under-estimation of
costs increases social cost regardless of the degree of the
polynomial. The key idea involved in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 is a strict generalization of Lemma 1 via a potential
function argument, to obtain the following difference in costs:
C(x˜)−C(x) ≤ −∑θ∈T (d+1rθ − 1)∑e∈E be(x˜θe − xθe). Recall
that in the previous inequality x˜ is the equilibrium solution
for a given instance G and x is an arbitrary feasible flow for
the same instance. The rest of the proof is analogous to that
Theorem 1.
Next, we generalize the price of anarchy bounds from
Theorem 2.
Proposition 3: For any multi-commodity routing game G
with shifted monomial cost functions of degree d, the ratio
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Fig. 2. Price of anarchy as a function of rmax = maxθ rθ for multi-
commodity selfish routing games for three different values of d when edge
cost functions are shifted monomials of degree d. Smaller values of price
of anarchy are favorable as they indicate that the cost of the equilibrium
solution is comparable to the social optimum. In general, we observe that
when rmax > 1, the price of anarchy under uncertainty is smaller than
that without uncertainty and vice-versa for rmax < 1— this is true for all
values of d. Interestingly, for d > 1, uncertainty leads to near-optimal price
of anarchy even for large values of rmax (e.g., rmax = 3.5)— this is not
the case when d = 1. This validates our premise that as the degree of the
polynomial cost function increases, user uncertainty becomes more helpful to
the system welfare.
between the social cost of the Nash equilibrium to that of the
socially optimal solution is at most
PoA(G) = (d+ 1)
(d+1)/d
γrmax(d+ 1)(d+1)/d − dr(d+1)/dmax
, (20)
where rmax = maxθ∈T rθ, and γ = minθ rθmaxθ rθ as long as rmax <
(γd )
d(d+ 1)(d+1).
Substituting d = 1 in the above equation, we obtain Theorem 2
as a special case. In the absence of uncertainty, it is known
that as d grows large, the price of anarchy bound grows as
O( dlog(d) ) [39]. Assuming γ = 1, for a constant rmax, the price
of anarchy bound from Equation (20) grows as O( drmax log(d) ).
For a finite value of d, the improvement in the price of anarchy
is much more significant as illustrated in Fig. 2.
IV. THE EFFECT OF HETEROGENEITY ON CONGESTION
Now that we have a better understanding of how uncertainty
affects the performance of the entire system as measured by
the social cost, we move on to a more nuanced setting where
different users have different levels of uncertainty. Our goal
in this section is to understand the effect of this heterogeneity
in uncertainty on the equilibrium congestion by studying
the following two questions: (i) how do the routing choices
adopted by the uncertain users impact the cost of the users
without uncertainty, and (ii) when is the equilibrium social
cost of a system with heterogeneous uncertainties smaller than
the social cost incurred when all users have no uncertainty?
A. Notation and Graph Topologies
To isolate the effect of heterogeneity on equilibrium con-
gestion, we restrict our attention to a selfish routing game on
an undirected network. There are two user types, i.e. T =
{θ1, θ2}. Users belonging to both these types seek to route
their flow between source node s and destination node t.
Finally, the uncertainty levels for the two user types are
specified as rθ1 = 1 and rθ2 = r > 0, and so, users of type θ1
are without uncertainty. We refer to this as the two-commodity
game with and without uncertainty. We slightly abuse notation
and use G = {G, T , (s, t), (µθ1 , µθ2), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E} to refer
to an instance of this game, and P to represent the set of s-t
paths in G.
Unlike the previous sections, where we made no assump-
tions on the graph structure, our next characterizations will
depend crucially on the network topology. Specifically, we
will consider two well-studied topologies: series-parallel and
linearly independent graphs. We provide the respective defi-
nitions below.
Definition 3: (Series-Parallel [23]) An undirected graph G
with a single source s and destination t is said to be a series-
parallel graph if no two s-t paths pass through an edge in
opposite directions.
There are a number of other equivalent definitions for this
class of graphs; e.g., a graph is said to be series-parallel if
it does not contain an embedded Wheatstone network [23].
Series-parallel graphs are an extremely well-studied topology
that naturally arise in a number of applications pertaining to
network routing. We refer the reader to [23], [40] for more
details.
Definition 4: (Linearly Independent [23]) An undirected
graph G with a single source s and destination t is said to
be linearly independent if every s-t path contains at least one
edge that does not belong to any other s-t path.
Our final definition involves a simple extension of the above
topology to include linearly independent graphs connected
serially. Formally, a graph G = (V, E) is said to consist
of two sub-graphs G1 = (V1, E1) with source-destination
pair (s1, t1) and G2 = (V2, E2) with source-destination pair
(s2, t2) connected in serial if V = V1 ∪ V1 with t1 = s2 and
E = E1 ∪ E2.
Definition 5: (Serially Linearly Independent (SLI)) An undi-
rected graph G with a single source s and destination t is
said to belong to the serially linearly independent class if (i)
G is linearly independent or (ii) G consists of two linearly
independent graphs connected in serial.
This extended topology was first introduced in [19]. These
three topologies are related as:
1) Every linearly independent graph belongs to the serially
linearly independent class.
2) Every serially linearly independent graph belongs to the
series-parallel class.
The first part follows from Definition 5. The second part is
due to the fact that any linearly independent network is series-
parallel (proved in [23]) and the property that when two series-
parallel graphs are connected in series, the resulting graph is
also series-parallel. Since series-parallel graphs happen to be
the most general topology studied in this section, (without loss
of generality) we focus on undirected graphs because every
edge can be uniquely traversed only in one direction.
B. Impact of Uncertain Users on Users without Uncertainty
We begin by studying what happens to the congestion cost
faced by the users without uncertainty as the uncertainty level
increases for the other users. This question is of considerable
interest in a number of settings. For example, in urban trans-
portation networks, the uncertainty about where a driver can
find available street parking can often cascade into increased
congestion for other drivers leading to a detrimental effect on
the overall congestion cost [38], [41]–[43].
The following theorem shows a somewhat surprising re-
sult. As long as the network topology is series-parallel, the
aggregate cost felt by users of type θ1 (users without any
uncertainty) always reduces when users of θ2 are uncertain
about the costs. In other words, the behavior under uncertainty
by one type of users always decreases the congestion costs of
other types of users who do not face any uncertainty.
Theorem 3: Given an instance G of the two-commodity
game with and without uncertainty such that the graph G is
series-parallel, let G1 denote a modified version of this instance
with no uncertainty (i.e. rθ1 = rθ2 = 1). Let x˜ and x
1 denote
the Nash equilibrium for the two instances, respectively. Then,
Cθ1(x˜) ≤ Cθ1(x1). (21)
where Cθ1(x) =
∑
e∈E Ce(xe)x
θ1
e is the aggregate cost of
users of type θ1.
Proof: It is well-known that [23, Lemma 3] for a series-
parallel graph G and any two feasible flows x, x′, there exists
a s–t path p with xp > 0, such that for every edge e ∈ p,
x′e ≤ xe. Now, consider flows x1 and x˜. Applying the previous
property, we get that, there exists a path p with x1p > 0 such
that for all e ∈ p, x˜e ≤ x1e.
We now bound both Cθ1(x˜) and Cθ1(x1) in terms of the
cost of the path p. Specifically, note that in the solution x1,
the path p has non-zero flow on it so that
Cθ1(x1) = µθ1
∑
e∈p Ce(x
1
e). (22)
However, in the solution x˜, we know that every user of type
θ1 is using a minimum cost path with respect to the true costs
and therefore, the cost of any path used by type θ1 is at least
that of the path p. Formally,
Cθ1(x˜) ≤ µθ1
∑
e∈p Ce(x˜e) ≤ µθ1
∑
e∈p Ce(x
1
e). (23)
The final inequality follows from the monotonicity of the cost
functions and the fact that x˜e ≤ x1e for all e ∈ p. Therefore,
we conclude that Cθ1(x˜) ≤ Cθ1(x1).
C. Characterization of Instances where Heterogeneity Helps
We now consider the impact of heterogeneity on the system
performance as a whole and present a simple characterization
based on the network topology and the level of uncertainty,
where the presence of uncertainty (among a fraction of the
user population) results in a decrease in the equilibrium social
cost. Specifically, we show that for SLI networks, as long
as the uncertainty level of users belonging to type θ2 is at
most two (i.e., 1 ≤ r = rθ2 ≤ 2), the social cost of the
equilibrium solution is always smaller than or equal to that of
the equilibrium when there is no uncertainty.
Before showing our theorem, we state the following tech-
nical lemma whose proof is deferred to Appendix C.
Lemma 3: Given any instance G of the two-commodity
routing game with and without uncertainty where the graph G
is linearly independent, let y and y1 denote the Nash equilibria
of instances G and G1 respectively. Then, it must be the case
that
yθ1p ≤ y1p ∀p ∈ P. (24)
Informally, the above lemma states that given equilibrium
flows y and y1 for any arbitrary instance G and its uncertainty-
free variant G1, the equilibrium solutions must satisfy the
property that for any path p, the flow on this path in the
absence of uncertainty (instance G1) must be greater than or
equal to its magnitude due to the uncertainty-free users in G.
Theorem 4: Consider any given instance G of the two-
commodity game with and without uncertainty. Let x˜ denote
the Nash equilibrium of this game and the corresponding game
instance G1, having no uncertainty has Nash equilibrium x1.
Then, as long as G belongs to the serially linearly independent
class and 1 ≤ r ≤ 2,
C(x˜) ≤ C(x1)
Proof of Theorem 4: Each SLI network can be bro-
ken down into a sequence of linearly independent networks
connected in series. Applying Definition 5 recursively, we
get a sequence of linearly independent sub-graphs G(1) =
(V (1), E(1)), G(2) = (V (2), E(2)), . . . , G(`) = (V (`), E(`))
with source-destination pairs (t0, t1), (t1, t2), . . . , (t`−1, t`) re-
spectively ( note that t0 = s, t` = t), that are connected in
series—i.e., G1 is connected in series with G2 such that the
destination t1 for G1 acts as the origin for G2. By definition,
the set of edges in these subgraphs are mutually disjoint.
Secondly, given the equilibrium flow x˜ on G for
instance G, we can divide this flow into components
(x˜(1), x˜(2), . . . , x˜(`)) such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ `, x˜(i) is
the sub-flow of x˜ on the graph G(i), and for every e ∈ E(i),
x˜(i)e = x˜e. Finally, it is not hard to see that x˜(i) must be
an equilibrium of the sub-instance of G restricted to the graph
G(i).
Given this decomposition, we apply Lemma 3 to each
G(i). Consider any index i: since the graph G(i) is linearly
independent, we can apply Lemma 3 and get that for any ti−1-
ti path p in G(i), x˜(i)θ1p ≤ x1(i)p.
Suppose that P(i) denotes the set of ti−1-ti paths in G(i).
Then, by Lemma 4 provided in Appendix D,
C(x˜) =
∑
e∈E Ce(x˜e)x˜e =
∑
e∈E(aex˜e + be)x˜e
≤∑e∈E (Ce(x1e)x1e + (2aex˜e + be)(x˜e − x1e))
≤ C(x1) +∑e∈E(2aex˜e + be)(x˜e − x1e) (25)
so that, using the above decomposition,
C(x˜) ≤ C(x1) +∑`i=1∑e∈E(i)(2aex˜(i)e + be)
· (x˜(i)e − x1(i)e)
= C(x1) +
∑`
i=1
∑
p∈P(i)
(∑
e∈p(2aex˜(i)e + be)
)
· (x˜(i)p − x1(i)p)
Therefore, to complete the proof it is sufficient to show that∑
p∈P(i)
(∑
e∈p(2aex˜(i)e + be)
)
(x˜(i)p−x1(i)p) ≤ 0 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ `.
Fix an arbitrary index i and consider the corresponding
graph G(i) and flows x˜(i) and x1(i). Recall that x1(i) is
the equilibrium solution in the absence of uncertainty and
therefore, minimizes the following potential function
Φ1(x) =
∑
e∈E(i)(
1
2ae(xe)
2 + bexe).
so that, again by Lemma 4,
0 ≤ Φ1(x˜(i))− Φ1(x1(i))
=
∑
e∈E(i)
(
ae
2 (x˜(i)e)
2 + bex˜(i)e
− ae2 (x1(i)e)2 − bex1(i)e
)
≤∑e∈E(i)(aex˜(i)e + be)(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e). (26)
Next, we claim that the term
∑
e∈E(i)(raex˜(i)e + be)(x˜(i)e−
x1(i)e) ≤ 0. Indeed, for convenience define Dr =∑
e∈E(i)(raex˜(i)e + be)(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e) so that
Dr =
∑
p∈P(i)
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e + be)(x˜(i)p − x1(i)p)
=
∑
p∈P(i)
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e + be)(∆xp)
=
∑
p∈P(i)−
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e + be)(∆xp)
+
∑
p∈P(i)+
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e + be)(∆xp), (27)
where ∆xp = x˜(i)p−x1(i)p and P(i)−,P(i)+ refer to the set
of the paths where ∆xp ≤ 0 and ∆xp > 0, respectively. From
Lemma 3, we know that x˜(i)θ1p ≤ x1(i)p for all p ∈ P(i).
Therefore, if ∆xp = x˜(i)θ1p + x˜(i)
θ2
p − x1(i)p > 0 for any
p ∈ P(i), it must be the case that x˜(i)θ2p > 0 for that path. In
other words, we have that for every p ∈ P(i)+, x˜(i)θ2p > 0.
Recall that x˜(i)θ2p denotes the total flow due to the users with
uncertainty on path p.
We make the following two observations that help us
simplify (27). First, by flow conservation, we know that∑
p∈P(i) ∆xp = 0. Second, for every p ∈ P(i)+, we have
that x˜(i)θ2p > 0, and so p is a min-cost path for the users with
uncertainty in the flow x˜(i) . This in turn implies that for any
p′ ∈ P(i) and p ∈ P(i)+, the following inequality is valid:∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e + be) ≤
∑
e∈p′(raex˜(i)e + be). (28)
Define crp := minp∈P(i)
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e+be). Then, using the
fact ∆xp ≤ 0 for all p ∈ P(i)− and that
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e +
be) ≥ crp for all p ∈ P(i)−, (27) can be rewritten as
Dr =
∑
p∈P(i)−
∑
e∈p(raex˜(i)e + be)(∆xp)
+
∑
p∈P(i)+
∑
e∈p c
r
p(∆xp)
≤∑p∈P(i)−∑e∈p crp(∆xp) +∑p∈P(i)+∑e∈p crp(∆xp)
= crp
∑
p∈P(i) ∆xp = 0 (29)
so that ∑
e∈E(i)(raex˜(i)e + be)(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e) ≤ 0 (30)
Summing inequalities (30) and (26), we see that the be terms
cancel out, leaving us with
(r − 1)∑e∈E(i) aex˜(i)e(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e) ≤ 0
which implies that∑
e∈E(i) aex˜(i)e(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e) ≤ 0 (31)
since r > 1. This, in turn, implies that
(2− r)∑e∈E(i) aex˜(i)e(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e) ≤ 0 (32)
since r ≤ 2. Adding (32) to (30), we get that∑
e∈E(i)(2aex˜(i)e + be)(x˜(i)e − x1(i)e) ≤ 0.
The above inequality in combination with (25) yields the
theorem.
D. Tightness of Results: Negative Examples
Our central result in this section (Theorem 4) shows that
for networks having the SLI topology with a limited amount
of uncertainty (r ∈ [1, 2]), the social cost at equilibrium in
the presence of uncertainty is always smaller than or equal to
the social cost without any uncertainty. Naturally, this raises
the question of whether the result is tight—i.e. what happens
when the graph does not belong to the SLI class or if r > 2. In
this section, we show the tightness of our results by illustrating
examples where uncertainty leads to an increase in congestion
costs when either one of the above requirements fail.
1) Series-Parallel Networks where Uncertainty Hurts:
Fig. 3 depicts an example of a network that is series-parallel
but not SLI, where the equilibrium cost when a small fraction
of users have an uncertainty of r = 2 becomes strictly larger
than the cost when all users have no uncertainty. The details of
the equilibrium solutions for this example are listed in Table I.
Contrasting our result in Theorem 4, this example indicates
that for networks that violate the SLI topology, the helpful
effects of uncertainty are not guaranteed even when r ∈ [1, 2].
Note that when r ∈ [1, 2], uncertainty can lead to an increase
in social cost only when it is exhibited by a (small) fraction
of users. This is because when the entire population has an
uncertainty parameter of 1 ≤ r ≤ 2, we know by Theorem 1
that the social cost must decrease for all graph topologies.
TABLE I
A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE FLOW ON EACH PATH AND SOCIAL
COST IN THE ABSENCE AND PRESENCE OF UNCERTAINTY: IN THE LATTER
CASE, A SMALL POPULATION OF  = 0.05 USERS HAVE AN UNCERTAINTY
OF r = 2. THE EQUILIBRIUM FLOWS FOR THE PATHS THAT ARE NOT
SPECIFIED ARE ZERO. NOTE THAT 591
200
= 2.955 > 62
21
≈ 2.9524 AND
THEREFORE, THE EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST IN THE ABSENCE OF
UNCERTAINTY IS STRICTLY SMALLER.
Instance Equilibrium Flow Cost
Certain xp1 =
4
21
, xp2 =
3
7
, xp3 =
8
21
62/21
Uncertain xp1 =
11
60
, xp2 =
23
60
, xp3 =
23
60
, xp4 =
1
2
591/200
2) Networks with Large Uncertainty, i.e., r > 2: We now
provide an example of a simple two-link Pigou network where
the equilibrium social cost with uncertainty r = 3 is strictly
larger than the equilibrium cost without any uncertainty. This
example illustrates that even for networks that fall within the
SLI class (parallel links are the most trivial class of networks),
uncertainty can be detrimental to social cost when r > 2.
s t
e1, 5x+ 2
i
e3,
1.5
x+
1.5
e2, x
e4,
23
15 e5, 3x+ 1
Fig. 3. An example of a series-parallel network that is not SLI, where
all traffic originates at node s and terminates at t. The label on each edge
represents its identity and cost. For the two-commodity game with and without
uncertainty, the total population is 1 and a population of  = 0.05 users have
an uncertainty factor of r = 2. We label the five source-destination paths as
p1 (e1), p2(e2, e3), p3(e2, e5), p4(e4, e3), and p5(e4, e5). The social cost
for this example in the presence of uncertainty is strictly larger than the social
cost in the absence of uncertainty, indicating that for networks that violate
the SLI condition, uncertainty does not always improve equilibrium quality.
x
e2
0.25x+ 2.5
e1
ts
Fig. 4. A two link Pigou network. We consider a two-commodity game with
and without uncertainty, where the total population is one: a population of
0 <  ≤ 1 users have an uncertainty parameter of r = 3. For every  > 0, the
equilibrium social cost without uncertainty is strictly smaller than the social
cost with uncertainty.
Consider the instance depicted in Fig. 4. In the absence
of uncertainty, the entire population uses e2, resulting in a
social cost of Ce2(1) = 1. Next, suppose that a population
of  ≤ 1 users have an uncertainty level of r = 3. If  ≤
2/15, then all  users route their flow on e1, and the social
cost of the equilibrium solution with uncertainty is given by
Ce1()+C2(1− )1−  = 1 + 0.5+ 1.252 which is strictly
greater than Ce2(1), the social cost without uncertainty. When
 > 2/15, only 2/15–th of the users prefer e1, and the increase
in social cost follows from the  = 2/15 case.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present our main simulation results on
both stylistic as well as realistic urban network topologies
comprising of two types of users—i.e. through traffic, parking
users (types θ1, θ2, respectively)—each associated with a sin-
gle commodity. We consider the more general edge-dependent
uncertainty model that was briefly mentioned at the end of
Section III and assume that the parking users have different
uncertainty levels on different parts of the network and the
through traffic does not suffer from uncertainty at all. For any
given edge e ∈ E , we assume that Cθe (x) and Cˆθe (x) denote
the actual and perceived cost of edge e by users of type θ. We
vary the level of uncertainty faced by the parking users, and
observe its effect on the social cost at equilibrium.
o1
b
s t
t2 Garage
o2
On-Street Parking
Fig. 5. A special case of our general multi-commodity network with
two types of users: parking users and through traffic. All of the network
traffic originates at the source node s. Users belonging to the through traffic
population simply select a (minimum-cost) path from s to t and incur the
latencies on each link. The parking users select between one of two parking
structures: on-street parking (indicated in green) with additional circling costs
and off-street parking (e.g., parking garage).
Despite the generality of the model considered here—
different user types have different beliefs and the level of
uncertainty depends on the edge under consideration—our
simulations validate the theoretical results presented in the
previous section. In particular, when the parking users are
cautious (over-estimate the congestion cost due to cruising and
waiting for a parking spot), we observe that the social cost
of the equilibrium decreases in both our experiments. On the
other hand, the behavior of parking users who under-estimate
the cost incurred due to searching for a parking spot leads to
a worse-cost equilibrium.
A. Effect of Uncertainty on On-Street vs Garage Parking
Inspired by the work in [38] which provides a framework for
integrating parking into a classical routing game that abstracts
route choices in urban networks, we begin with a somewhat
stylized example of an urban network, depicted and described
in Fig. 5. The users looking for a parking spot are faced
with two options: (i) on-street parking which, as in reality,
is cheaper but leads to larger wait times due to cruising in
search of parking; (ii) an off-street or a private garage option
that is much easier to access (in terms of wait times) at the
expense of a higher price.
To understand the costs faced by the parking users (type θ2),
let Eos be the set of edges in the on-street parking structure
(the green edges in Fig. 5). For parking users that select the
on-street option, the cost on edges e ∈ Eos are of the form
Cθ2e (xe) = C
θ2
e,`(xe) + C
θ2
e,os(xe), (33)
where Cθ2e,`(xe) = aexe + be is the travel latency part of the
cost and Cθ2e,os(xe) = aosxe + bos is the parking part of the
cost. Fig. 5 is easily converted into a two-commodity network
by creating a fake edge e˜ from node o1 to t2 that has the
accumulated parking costs from the edges in Eos—i.e.
Cθ2e˜ (xe˜) =
∑
e∈Eos C
θ2
e,os(xe˜) = a¯osxe˜ + b¯os. (34)
Then, the costs on edges in Eos are re-defined to only contain
the travel latency component of the cost, and this is the same
for both types of users: for e ∈ Eos,
Cθ1e (xe) = C
θ2
e (xe) = aexe + be. (35)
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Fig. 6. The left plot shows the on-street parking population flow (mass) under the social optimum and the Nash equilibrium with and without uncertainty as
r, the level of uncertainty of the parking users, varies. The right plot shows the equilibrium quality as measured by the ratio of the social cost of the Nash
equilibrium to that of the social optimum as a function of r. True costs of off-street options are notoriously more expensive than on-street options. As r
increases, we observe from the left plot that more users move away from on-street parking, which in turn affects the social cost as seen from the right plot.
In particular, when r > 1, the users over-estimate both on-street and garage wait times leading to a decrease in social cost as more users choose the garage
option. On the other hand, for r < 1, users view the garage option adversely, which leads to more congestion. We note that these observations are consistent
with empirically observed human behavior [44] suggesting that an increase in cost from a lower point of reference is seen as more of a loss than a marginal
increase in cost from a higher point of reference. At r ≈ 2, the users divide themselves optimally between the on-street and garage options leading to full
efficiency; as r increases beyond 2, the equilibrium is still better than the case without uncertainty, yet no longer optimal.
For the off-street parking structure, the edge, say e′, from o2
to t2 has cost
Cθ2e′ (xe′) = apgxe′ + bpg (36)
and all other edges in the network have costs
Cθ1e (xe) = C
θ2
e (xe) = aexe + be. (37)
The price on-street is generally lower than that of a private
garage, whereas the inequality is reversed for wait times.
Parking garages typically comprise of a larger capacity than
on-street parking options and one expects this to be reflected
in the a¯os and apg terms.
The uncertainty is faced by users of type θ2 only on the
costs pertaining to parking such that the congestion-dependent
component of their parking cost is multiplied by a parameter
r > 0. This captures the notion that the users may face
uncertainty regarding the number of other users competing for
the same parking spots(s) or the capacity of each structure. In
the converted two commodity network, this translates to
Cˆθ2e˜ (xe˜) = ra¯osxe˜ + b¯os
where e˜ is the fake edge from o1 to t2 and
Cˆθ2e′ (xe′) = rapgxe′ + bpg
where e′ is the edge from o2 to t2. As mentioned previously,
the through traffic population (type θ1) does not suffer from
uncertainty on any of its edges and therefore, rθ1(e) = 1 with
respect to every edge e.
Note that although the uncertainty only applies to the
parking users, their decision also affects the through traffic
users as both user types share a subset of the edges on their
routes. This phenomenon has been commonly observed in
cities where non-parking users often face congestion due to
the circling behavior of drivers looking for parking [42].
For the simulations, we assume that there is a total popu-
lation mass of 2 originating at the source node s, comprising
of an equal number of parking and through traffic users. The
edge congestion functions are selected uniformly at random
from a suitable range. The costs on the parking structures are
set as follows:
1) On-Street Parking: The on-street parking structure is
assumed to contain a fixed number of parking spots, and
the parameter a¯os is chosen to be inversely proportional
to this quantity. The constant term b¯os captures the price
paid by drivers for on-street parking and is selected
based on parking prices commonly used in large cities
multiplied by a constant that captures how users tend to
trade-off between time (congestion) and money.
2) Off-street Parking: Off-street parking is assumed to have
a large number of available parking spots; thus, we set
apg = 0. The parameter bpg is set to be the price of off-
street parking (e.g., a garage) multiplied by the same
trade-off parameter as above.
Fig. 6 shows how the parking users divide themselves
among the on-street and garage option (left plot) and how this
affects equilibrium quality as r varies (right plot). From the
left plot, we observe that at the social optimum, approximately
51% of the parking population prefers on-street parking. With
no uncertainty (i.e. when r = 1), at the Nash equilibrium more
parking users (around 80%) gravitate towards the cheaper on-
street option leading to higher congestion and inefficiency—
that is, even without uncertainty, the system is inefficient as is
expected. This is reminiscent of the classic Pigou example [39]
in traffic networks.
As r increases—that is, as users become more cautious
in their beliefs about parking congestion—more users start
flocking to the off-street option due to the fact that they
perceive a multiplicative increase in the congestion-dependent
term. This results in an improvement to efficiency. On the
contrary, for users who tend to under-estimate parking costs
(r < 1), the appeal of parking in off-street options decreases
and more users flock towards on-street parking leading to
increased congestion and poor equilibrium quality.
The effect of the above behavior on equilibrium quality
can be seen in the right-hand plot in Fig. 6. The graph indi-
cates that a cautious approach under uncertainty (users over-
estimating costs) helps improve equilibrium quality, whereas
lack of caution results in enhanced congestion in the network.
In fact, we notice when r < 1, the price of anarchy increases in
a rather steep fashion as r decreases. Finally, we observe that
even though our theoretical results guarantee an improvement
in equilibrium congestion only in the range of 1 ≤ r ≤ 2,
our simulation results lend credence to the claim that even
highly cautious behavior (r > 2) can lead to a decrease in the
social cost i.e., users over-estimating the costs in the face of
uncertainty is always preferable to a lack of uncertainty.
B. Parking vs. Through Traffic in Downtown Seattle
In a similar manner to the toy example, we take a real-
world urban traffic network (depicted in Fig. 7) that captures
a slice of a highly congested area in downtown Seattle. The
network contains both on-street and off-street parking options
and the parking population experiences both a travel latency
cost and a parking cost, both of which we model as affine
functions. Once again, this can be converted to a standard
two-commodity instance by adding a new (fake) destination
node tθ2 and including fake edges from (i) the top left and
bottom right nodes in the on-street parking zone (boundary
nodes on the blue colored dotted area in Fig. 7a) to tθ2 ; (ii) the
node containing the parking garage (marked with a ‘P’ symbol
in Fig. 7a) to tθ2 . By adding fake edges from only specific
boundary nodes in the on-street parking area, we are able to
capture the added congestion due to the cruising and circling
behavior exhibited by users searching for parking spots. As
with our previous example, we assume that the through traffic
faces no uncertainty (rθ1(e) = 1 for all edges) and the parking
users face an uncertainty parameter of r > 0 only on the fake
edges, which affects their perception of the parking costs.
For the simulations, we assume that the parking traffic
originates at a few select nodes in the network (indicated in
magenta in Fig. 7) and wishes to route their flow to either
an on-street parking slot or a garage. On the other hand, the
through traffic originates at every node in the network and has
a single destination, which represents drivers seeking to leave
the downtown area via state highway 99.
The parameters for our simulations were chosen similarly
to the example in Section V-A. Specifically, the cost functions
for the two parking structures were based on an estimation
of the number of available parking slots (which influence the
wait times), and the hourly price for parking for both on-
street and garage parking in Seattle. Furthermore, owing to the
uniformity of the downtown roads, we assumed that all edges
in the network have the same congestion cost function, which
were sufficiently scaled in order to ensure that the parking
costs are comparable to the transit costs.
As seen in Fig. 7a, in the downtown Seattle network,
the equilibrium without uncertainty is sub-optimal as more
parking users select the cheaper on-street option. This leads
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(c) Equilibrium inefficiency as a function of r
Fig. 7. Setup and results for the parking and through traffic example modeled
on a region of downtown Seattle. In (a) and (b), the network superimposed on
the corresponding area in downtown Seattle is shown. The parking population
originates at the magenta nodes, whereas the through traffic begins at every
grey node and terminates at the green node. The blue dotted box represents
the on-street parking zone and the parking symbol (‘P’) is the location of the
off-street parking garage. The color on each edge depicts the intensity of flow
on that edge: the intensity increases as the color transitions from gray to red.
to heavy congestion in the network (indicated by the red edges)
as parking users distributed across the network approach the
on-street parking area. That being said, the equilibrium without
uncertainty is not as sub-optimal as the simple network in
Fig. 5 as the cost functions are more symmetric and parking
users who originate closer to the parking garage prefer using
that option despite the higher price.
In the presence of uncertainty, we observe an interesting
phenomenon. When the parking users are cautious, the garage
option becomes more preferable to users who are equidistant
from both parking locations. The parking users distribute
themselves more evenly across the two options, which in turn
leads to lesser congestion in the middle of the network.
It is well-known that sub-optimal behavior by the parking
users can cascade and lead to increased congestion for through
traffic [42]. Our simulation results indicate that the routes
adopted by the parking users under uncertainty helps alleviate
some of this congestion.
Fig. 7c shows the inefficiency of each of the equilibria as
a function of the uncertainty parameter value of the parking
users. Specifically, at r ≈ 2, the equilibrium solution coincides
with the socially optimal flow. On the other hand, for r < 1,
the social cost of the equilibrium solution increases because
more users select the on-street parking option. This in turn
leads to heavier congestion in the rest of the network. Once
again, we observe that over-estimation can lead to a decrease
in social cost even when r > 2 (up to r ≈ 2.5 in this
case). However, unlike our results in Fig. 6, significant cost
over-estimation leads to large inefficiency— this is due to the
specific placement of the parking garage in the downtown
example. More precisely as r increases, a large fraction of the
population favors the garage, whose location intersects with
the route adopted by the through traffic. Therefore, beyond a
certain threshold, the negative effects of congestion outweigh
the positive effects of users choosing the parking garage
leading to sub-optimal equilibrium for r > 2.5.
We conclude by remarking that even though cautious behav-
ior results in only a small improvement in the price of anarchy
(see Fig. 7c), even a small improvement in daily congestion
in downtown areas could result in economic gains.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we consider a multi-commodity selfish routing
game where different types of users face different levels
of uncertainty quantified by a multiplicative parameter rθ.
Broadly classifying the user attitudes as cautious and not-
cautious, we provide several theoretical results highlighting
the effect that when users over-estimate their network costs,
equilibrium quality tends to improve and vice-versa when
users under-estimate the costs. To our knowledge, this is
the first work that provides a characterization of equilibrium
quality as a function of uncertainty in networks with multiple
types of users, each facing a different level of uncertainty.
Although we focus on linear congestion cost functions,
many of our results extend naturally to polynomial cost
functions of the form Ce(xe) = aexed+be. In fact, we showed
that uncertainty becomes more favorable as the degree d of the
cost function increases. An important direction of future work
is to extend the results to arbitrary convex functions.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Recall from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium solution
x˜ minimizes the corresponding potential function Φr(x).
Therefore, for any arbitrary flow vector x′, we have that
Φr(x˜)− Φr(x′) ≤ 0. Indeed,
C(x′) =
∑
e∈E(aex
′
e + be)x
′
e
=
∑
e∈E
(
ae(x
′
e)
2 + be
∑
θ∈T 2
x′θe
rθ
+ be
∑
θ∈T (1− 2rθ )x′θe
)
= 2Φr(x
′)−∑e∈E be∑θ∈T ( 2rθ − 1)x′θe . (38)
Applying (38) to the solutions x˜ and x, we get that
C(x˜)− C(x) = 2Φr(x˜)− 2Φr(x)
−∑e∈E be∑θ∈T ( 2rθ − 1)(x˜θe − xθe) (39)
≤ −∑e∈E be∑θ∈T ( 2rθ − 1)(x˜θe − xθe) (40)
= −∑θ∈T ( 2rθ − 1)∑e∈E be∆xθe. (41)
where the inequality (40) follows from the fact Φr(x˜) −
Φr(x) ≤ 0. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Fixing all of the vectors and the function in the left-hand
side of
f(x)x
f(x′)x′+
∑n
i=1(xi−x′i)f(rix) ≤ 4
(
4r∗ − (r∗)2
)−1
, (42)
we first derive a lower bound on the denominator (i.e. identify
when the denominator is minimized over the space of all valid
instantiations of the parameter set). Let us begin with the
second term in the denominator:∑n
i=1(xi − x′i)f(rix) =
∑n
i=1(xi − x′i)(riax+ b)
=
∑n
i=1 xiriax−
∑n
i=1 x
′
iriax+ b(x− x′)
≥∑ni=1 xir∗ax−∑ni=1 x′ir∗ax+ b(x− x′)
≥ xr∗ax− x′r∗ax+ b(x− x′)
Using this upper bound on the rest of the terms in the
denominator, we get that
f(x′)x′+
∑n
i=1(xi−x′i)f(rix) ≥ a(x′)2+bx+xr∗ax−x′r∗ax.
For any given fixed value of x, consider the function a(x′)2−
x′r∗ax: by basic calculus, its minimum value is attained if
x′ = r
∗x
2 . In other words, for any x, x
′, we can conclude
that a(x′)2 − x′r∗ax ≥ (r∗)2 ax24 − (r∗)2 ax
2
2 = −(r∗)2 ax
2
4 .
Substituting this lower bound into the above equation, we get
that
f(x′) +
∑n
i=1(xi − x′i)f(rix) ≥ −(r∗)2 ax
2
4 + bx+ r∗ax
2.
Now that we have removed the dependence on x′, we can
substitute this back into (15) to get that
f(x)x
f(x′)x′+
∑n
i=1(xi−x′i)f(rix) ≤
ax2+bx
− (r∗)2ax24 +bx+r∗ax2
≤ ax2
− (r∗)2ax24 +r∗ax2
= 44r∗−(r∗)2
which completes the proof. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
We prove Lemma 3 via induction. Consider the following
inductive claim.
Claim 1: Given instances I = {G, T , (s, t), (µθ1 , µθ2),
(1, r), (Ce)e∈E} and I ′ = {G, T , (s, t), (µ′θ1 , µ′θ2), (1, 1),
(Ce)e∈E} where the graph G is linearly independent, let
y and y1 denote the Nash equilibria of the two instances,
respectively. Then, if∑
e∈p Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p Ce(y
1
e), ∀ p ∈ P s.t. yθ1p > 0, (43)
it must be the case that yθ1p ≤ y1p for all p ∈ P .
To prove Lemma 3, it is sufficient to prove the above claim.
Indeed, setting I = G and I ′ = G1, we can directly apply
the claim to prove the lemma statement. In order to verify
that the condition from (43) is satisfied, first observe that
linearly independent networks are a special case of series-
parallel networks. Now, applying [23, Lemma 3] to the flows
y and y1 as defined in the statement of Lemma 3, we get
that there exists a path p∗ ∈ P with y1p∗ > 0 such that∑
e∈p∗ Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p∗ Ce(y
1
e). However, p
∗ is a min-cost
path in y1 and its cost in y is an upper-bound on that of
any min-cost path used by users of type θ1. This immediately
implies that for any p with yθ1p > 0 its cost in y (where it is
a min-cost path for users of type θ1) must be smaller than or
equal to its cost in y1 (where all users have no uncertainty).
The proof of Claim 1 proceeds by induction on the number
of edges in the graph G = (V, E)—that is, given a graph G, we
assume that the inductive claim holds for all instances defined
on any graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) such that |E ′| < |E| and proceed
from there.
We also state a property of linearly-independent graphs,
which will be useful for our proof.
Proposition 4 ( [23, Proposition 5]): A two terminal net-
work G is linearly-independent if and only if: (i) it consists
of a single edge, or (ii) it is the result of connecting two
linearly-independent networks in parallel, or (iii) it is the result
of connecting in series a linearly independent network and a
network with a single edge.
Proof of Claim 1: Let us start with the base case. The
inductive hypothesis is trivially true when the graph G consists
of a single edge between the source and sink (i.e. E = {e}). All
of the users must route their flow on this edge only, regardless
of their uncertainty level. Since we are given (by assumption)
that the instance satisfies the condition that
Ce(ye) ≤ Ce(y1e),
by monotonicity of the cost functions, we get that ye ≤ y1e .
Of course, this implies that yθ1e ≤ y1e and the inductive claim
thus holds for the base case.
Now, let us consider the inductive case. Consider the in-
ductive claim with respect to an arbitrary linearly independent
graph G = (V, E) consisting of two or more edges, and assume
that the inductive hypothesis holds for all instances defined on
linearly independent graphs G′ = (V ′, E ′) such that |E ′| < |E|.
From Proposition 4, we know that G consists of two sub-
graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) connected either
in parallel or in series with |E2| = 1 (i.e., G2 is simply a
single edge). We consider both cases, apply the inductive claim
recursively to both sub-graphs, and merge the resulting flows
to prove the inductive claim for the original graph G.
Let (s1, t1), (s2, t2) denote the origin-destination pairs for
G1 and G2 respectively. We use P1 to denote the set of s1-t1
paths in G1 and P2 to denote the set of s2-t2 paths in G2.
When G1 and G2 are connected in series (case 1), we have
that s2 = t1. When they are connected in parallel (case 2),
s1 = s2, t1 = t2. We treat each of these cases separately.
(case 1) Subgraphs connected in series. We first introduce
some additional notation required for this part of the proof.
As we did in the proof of Theorem 4, we use y(1) and y(2)
to denote the sub-flows of y with respect to graphs G1 and
G2. Similarly, we define y1(1) and y1(2) to be the sub-flows
of y1. Recall that G2 consists simply of a single edge.
Since y is an equilibrium for I, it must be the case that
y(1) and y(2) are equilibria for G1, G2 respectively for
suitably defined sub-instances, I1 = {G1, T , (s1, t1), (µθ1 ,
µθ2), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E1} and I2 = {G2, T , (s2, t2), (µθ1 , µθ2),
(1, r), (Ce)e∈E2}, respectively. In a similar manner, y1(1) and
y1(2) represent equilibria for the instances I ′1 = {G1, T ,
(s1, t1), (µ
′
θ1
, µ′θ2), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E1} and I ′2 = {G2, T ,
(s2, t2), (µ
′
θ1
, µ′θ2), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E2}, respectively. These are
formally summarized in the notation table below.
TABLE II
NOTATION TABLE PROVIDING DIFFERENT INSTANCE DEFINITIONS AND
IDENTIFYING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM (N.E.) FOR EACH SUB-INSTANCE
WHEN G1 AND G2 ARE CONNECTED IN SERIES.
Game Instance Definition N.E.
I {G, T , (s, t), (µθ1 , µθ2 ), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E} yI1 {G1, T , (s1, t1), (µθ1 , µθ2 ), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E1} y(1)I2 {G2, T , (s2, t2), (µθ1 , µθ2 ), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E2} y(2)I′ {G, T , (s, t), (µ′θ1 , µ′θ2 ), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E} y1I′1 {G1, T , (s1, t1), (µ′θ1 , µ′θ2 ), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E1} y1(1)I′2 {G2, T , (s2, t2), (µ′θ1 , µ′θ2 ), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E2} y1(2)
Proceeding with the proof, we know from (43) that for any
path p ∈ P with yθ1p > 0,
∑
e∈p Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p Ce(y
1
e).
Dividing the path p into sub-paths p1 and p2 representing its
intersection with G1, G2 respectively, we get that∑
e∈p1 Ce(ye) +
∑
e∈p2 Ce(ye)
≤∑e∈p1 Ce(y1e) +∑e∈p2 Ce(y1e).
Based on the above inequality, we infer one of the following
two cases must be true:∑
e∈p1 Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p1 Ce(y
1
e) (44)
or ∑
e∈p2 Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p2 Ce(y
1
e). (45)
Separately, we prove the inductive claim for each case.
Suppose that (44) holds. Since the graph G1 is linearly
independent, we can apply the inductive claim to instances
I1 and I ′1 to get that y(1)θ1p ≤ y1(1)p for every path p ∈ P1.
However, recall that G2 consists of only one edge (call it
e2). This implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between every path in P and path in P1. Specifically, for
every path p ∈ P , there exists a unique path p1 ∈ P1 such
that p = p1 ∪ {e2}. Since the mapping is a bijection, this
implies that for every p = p1 ∪ {e2}, it must be the case that
yθ1p = y(1)
θ1
p1 and y
1
p = y
1(1)p1 . Informally, the addition of
a single common edge to all paths does not alter the flow
distribution. Therefore, we can conclude that for every path
p ∈ P ,
yθ1p = y(1)
θ1
p1 ≤ y1(1)p1 = y1p.
This proves the inductive claim for this case.
Next, suppose that (45) holds. Once again, since G2 con-
sists of a single edge e2, the condition implies that ye2 =
y(2)e2 ≤ y1e2 = y1(2)e2 . Thus, we infer that conditional upon∑
e∈p2 Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p2 Ce(y
1
e), µθ1 +µθ2 ≤ µ′θ1 +µ′θ2 . That
is, the total population for instance I is smaller than or equal
to the total population for instance I ′.
Since linearly independent networks are a special case of
series-parallel, we can now apply [23, Lemma 3] for flows
y(1) and y1(1) on graph G1. Since µθ1 + µθ2 ≤ µ′θ1 + µ′θ2 ,
this of course, implies that there exists at least one origin-
destination path p∗ in G1 with y1(1)p∗ > 0 satisfying∑
e∈p∗ Ce(y(1)e) ≤
∑
e∈p∗ Ce(y
1(1)e). Therefore, we can
conclude that for any path p ∈ P1 with yθ1p > 0, we have,∑
e∈p Ce(y(1)e) ≤
∑
e∈p Ce(y
1(1)e). (46)
The above equation symbolizes the induction condition as
described in (43). Applying the inductive hypothesis recur-
sively to instances I1, I ′1, and using the same reasoning as
before, we conclude that for every s-t path p ∈ P , yθ1p ≤ y1p.
This concludes the proof for the series case.
(case 2) Subgraphs G1, G2 connected in parallel to obtain
G. The proof for this case proceeds similarly to the case
where the networks are connected in series. Once again, we
divide the flows y and y1 into sub-flows y(1),y(2) and y1(1)
and y1(2). Moreover, we use µθ1(1), µθ2(1) to denote the
total flow without and with uncertainty in sub-graph G1 and
similarly so, for all the other subgraphs and sub-flows. A
comprehensive notation table is listed below.
TABLE III
NOTATION TABLE PROVIDING DIFFERENT INSTANCE DEFINITIONS AND
IDENTIFYING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM (N.E.) FOR EACH SUB-INSTANCE
WHEN G1 AND G2 ARE CONNECTED IN PARALLEL.
Game Instance Definition N.E.
I {G, T , (s, t), (µθ1 , µθ2 ), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E} yI1 {G1, T , (s, t), (µθ1 (1), µθ2 (1), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E1} y(1)I2 {G2, T , (s, t), (µθ1 (2), µθ2 (2)), (1, r), (Ce)e∈E2} y(2)I′ {G, T , (s, t), (µ′θ1 , µ′θ2 ), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E} y1I′1 {G1, T , (s, t), (µ′θ1 (1), µ′θ2 (1), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E1} y1(1)I′2 {G2, T , (s, t), (µ′θ1 (2), µ′θ2 (2), (1, 1), (Ce)e∈E2} y1(2)
Before applying the inductive claim recursively to the two
subgraphs, we need to verify that the condition specified
in (43) is satisfied for the subgraphs. We know that the
instances I, I ′ satisfy the condition in (43) (this is part of
our assumption). That is, for any p ∈ P such that yθ1p > 0∑
e∈p Ce(ye) ≤
∑
e∈p Ce(y
1
e). (47)
Since the graphs G1, G2 are connected in parallel, the set of
edges and paths in each graph are disjoint. In other words,
P = P1 ∪ P2. Moreover, the path-flows in y coincide
with those in y(1) or y(2)—e.g., for any p1 ∈ P1, we
have that yp1 = y(1)p1 and so on. This combined with
(47) implies that for any path p1 ∈ P1 with y(1)θ1p1 > 0,∑
e∈p1 Ce(y(1)e) ≤
∑
e∈p1 Ce(y
1(1)e). Therefore, the flows
y(1) and y1(1) satisfy the inductive condition. Similarly, we
can show that the flows y(2) and y1(2) also satisfy (43).
Applying the inductive claim to the instances I1 and I ′1,
we get that
y(1)θ1p1 ≤ y1(1)p1 ∀p1 ∈ P1 (48)
Similarly, we can apply the inductive claim to instance pair
I2, I ′2 to get that
y(2)θ1p2 ≤ y1(2)p2 ∀p2 ∈ P2 (49)
Since y = y(1)∪y(2) and y1 = y1(1)∪y1(2), the inductive
claim follows immediately. That is, merging the statements
in (48) and (49), we get that for all p ∈ P , the inequality
yθ1p ≤ y1p holds. This completes the proof.
D. Technical Claims
Lemma 4: Given any convex, continuously differentiable,
non-decreasing function f(x), for any x1, x2 ≥ 0 in its
domain, we have that
f(x2)− f(x1) ≤ f ′(x2)(x2 − x1), (50)
where f ′(x2) is the derivative of f(x) evaluated at x2.
Proof: We prove the result in two cases. First, suppose
that x2 ≥ x1. Since f(x) is convex, non-decreasing, it must
mean that its derivative f ′(x) is also non-negative and non-
decreasing, and therefore, f ′(x2) ≥ f ′(x) for all x ∈ [x1, x2]
Therefore, we have that
f(x2)− f(x1) ≤
∫ x2
x=x1
f ′(x2)dx = f ′(x2)(x2 − x1).
Next, consider the case when x2 ≤ x1. In this case, f(x2)−
f(x1) is negative or zero. So, similar to the above case we
have that
f(x1)− f(x2) ≥
∫ x2
x=x1
f ′(x2)dx = f ′(x2)(x1 − x2).
Reversing the above inequality gives us the lemma.
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